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The precautionary principle (PP) has been used in the evaluation of the effectiveness 
and/or cost-effectiveness of interventions designed to prevent future harms in a range 
of activities, particularly in the area of the environment. Here, we provide details of 
circumstances under which the PP can be applied to the topic of harm reduction in 
Public Health. The definition of PP that we use says that the PP reverses the onus of 
proof of effectiveness between an intervention and its comparator when the intervention 
has been designed to reduce harm. We first describe the two frameworks used for 
health-care evaluation: evidence-based medicine (EBM) and decision theory (DT). EBM 
is usually used in treatment effectiveness evaluation, while either EBM or DT may be 
used in evaluating the effectiveness of the prevention of illness. For cost-effectiveness, 
DT is always used. The expectation in Public Health is that interventions employed to 
reduce harm will not actually increase harm, where “harm” in this context does not 
include opportunity cost. That implies that an intervention’s effectiveness can often 
be assumed. Attention should therefore focus on its cost-effectiveness. This view is 
consistent with the conclusions of DT. It is also very close to the PP notion of reversing 
the onus of proof, but is not consistent with EBM as normally practiced, where the onus 
is on showing a new practice to be superior to usual practice with a sufficiently high 
degree of certainty. Under our definitions, we show that where DT and the PP differ 
in their evaluation is in cost-effectiveness, but only for decisions that involve potential 
catastrophic circumstances, where the nation-state will act as if it is risk-averse. In those 
cases, it is likely that the state will pay more, and possibly much more, than DT would 
allow, in an attempt to mitigate impending disaster. That is, the rules that until now 
have governed all cost-effectiveness analyses are shown not to apply to catastrophic 
situations, where the PP applies.
Keywords: precautionary principle, evidence-based medicine, decision theory, effectiveness, cost-effectiveness
introdUCtion
Pregnant women and those who hope to become pregnant in the near future should take precautions 
so that they are not exposed to the Zika virus during or just before pregnancy. This is because of the 
risk of microcephaly of the fetus, even though (at the time of writing) there is no definitive scientific 
“proof ” that the Zika virus causes the condition. That is, faced with the uncertainty of cause and effect 
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and with a serious possibility of danger, people and communities 
are often advised to alter their behavior (and to spend money to 
do so) without the necessity of a high degree of scientific proof 
that would normally be required to validate an intervention.
Circumstances where precautions are taken are common. 
Pedestrians crossing roads, even those that are little used, still 
look both ways for traffic. Drivers of vehicles on public roads 
make defensive (i.e., precautionary) decisions on a continuous 
basis. No formal estimation of the statistical level of proof of 
danger is ever made. It is reasonable to assume that this is because 
the potential cost of a disastrous outcome is high, but the cost of 
taking precautions is generally negligible. In this paper, we are 
concerned with the taking of precautions to avoid dangers (at a 
societal level) when the costs of doing so may not be negligible. 
Such circumstances are the potential realm of the precautionary 
principle (PP).
For all that, scholars and legislators have yet to agree on a 
definition of the PP, which would leave no ambiguity and could 
thus be used as a respectable tool in public policy debates.
The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(1), the first major official international document to recognize 
the PP, states that “…  where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty shall not be used 
as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent 
environmental degradation.” In other words, in the face of 
reasonable concerns as to the severity of a threat, the burden of 
proof of whether a mitigating intervention should be carried out 
should not fall on those undertaking the intervention. Despite 
the principle having initially been associated with environmental 
law, it is becoming increasingly important in other areas of public 
policy debate. The EU incorporated it into its legislation, and it is 
increasingly mentioned in reference to international commerce 
agreements, all without a clear framework for its use having 
being developed (2).
The main problem with the PP is the inability to agree on 
the degree of precaution required and its cost, rather than the 
necessity of precaution per  se. The difficulty arises because the 
size, probability, and timing of a potential calamity are often 
unknown. Supporters of a “strong” application of the principle 
claim that action should always be taken to prevent harm in 
those situations in which the threat could be severe, while those 
advocating a “weak” version maintain that precaution should be 
allowed but not required, as it should take into consideration 
cost-effectiveness factors and the inability of some countries to 
provide the necessary protection (3). The debate has been further 
stimulated by ethical concerns, cultural influences, and ideologi-
cal differences between those believing that the application of the 
PP could hinder progress and those believing that preventing 
harm is more important for public policy (4, 5).
The PP has received very little attention from economists. 
It seems that at least in part, this is because it has lacked a 
firm theoretical basis. Quiggin (6) suggested that the PP was 
necessarily an ambiguous concept, and that a full economic 
analysis may not be possible due to the existence of “unknown 
unknowns” (7). Nevertheless, Grant and Quiggin (8) subse-
quently carried out a game theory analysis of the PP using a 
decision tree approach, where the unknown unknowns have 
been corralled in such a way that decisions can still allow for 
the PP to some extent.
This paper describes the evolution of the evaluation of health 
care, with particular reference to public health. It then shows how 
the PP can be incorporated into the decision-making process, and 
what difference it makes to that process. In particular, it shows 
that decisions based on taking the PP into account, where the 
intervention under consideration is designed to reduce harm, 
will be aligned with cost-effectiveness decisions based on deci-
sion theory (DT) (9–13) in those cases for which risk pooling 
is possible. However, for circumstances in which the risk is too 
great to be pooled, interventions to reduce harm may be approved 
under the PP even when the cost of precautionary action exceeds 
the usual cost-effectiveness thresholds.
tHe eVoLUtion oF eVaLUation in 
HeaLtH Care, WitH an eMpHasis on 
pUBLiC HeaLtH
For the purposes of this paper, public health is defined as the 
prevention of ill health and the promotion of healthy lifestyles. 
A logical framework of nine criteria for defining causality and 
deciding (on the balance of probabilities) whether an association 
between variables was causative was developed by Hill (14). 
Since Hill wrote, there has been a huge increase in the number of 
randomized controlled trials (RCTs). Well-conducted RCTs can 
virtually eliminate biases and establish the direction of causation 
of the effect of an intervention. RCTs thus find themselves at the 
top of a hierarchy of evidence in which Hill’s other criteria play a 
secondary role. This is particularly true in the appraisal of health 
technology assessment (HTA), where RCTs are used to establish 
the direction of the effect of an intervention, where the estimated 
effect is sufficiently large (compared with its SD) to have only a 
specified small probability of being due to chance. This process 
uses only “objective” probabilities – estimated from the propor-
tions of people involved in a particular occurrence. For example, 
if 160 people out of 200 in a trial respond to an experimental drug, 
the estimated response probability will equal 0.8. “Subjective” 
probabilities, such as those in the form of prior beliefs (that is, 
before the trial has taken place) about how effective the drug 
might be, will be subject to bias and will not be included as part 
of the objective assessment of the effectiveness of the drug. This 
whole process, including the hierarchy of evidence, constitutes 
the “external clinical evidence” that, together with the expertise 
of the clinician, goes under the name of evidence-based medicine 
(EBM) (15).
The Methods Manual for the Technology Appraisal section of 
the UK’s National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (16), 
arguably the most influential body in the world for the evaluation 
of health-care interventions, requires firstly that an intervention’s 
effectiveness be established from external evidence with sufficient 
certainty. In Technology Appraisal, where RCTs are routinely 
available, “sufficient certainty” covers the ability of RCTs to reduce 
biases to negligible levels and removes any consideration of prior 
beliefs, which would introduce bias of unknown size. In practice, 
other criteria generally play a role in the decision-making process 
taBLe 1 | a comparison of evidence-based medicine and  
decision-theory characteristics for health-care evaluation.
evidence-based medicine decision theory
• Only objective probabilities allowed • Subjective probabilities allowed
• No prior beliefs allowed • Prior beliefs allowed
• No explicit role for verified theory • Recognizes verified theory
• Does not maximize aggregate 
health: decision maker is 
conservative
• Maximizes aggregate health when 
decision maker acts as if risk-neutral
• Recognizes a hierarchy of 
evidence with properly powered 
RCTs (and their meta-analysis) at 
the top
• Recognizes the same hierarchy of 
evidence but is better adapted to 
circumstances where RCTs do not 
exist
• Allows observation in absence of 
good RCT evidence
• Allows observation in absence of 
good RCT evidence
• Is ideally suited to effectiveness 
in health technology appraisal, 
particularly drug appraisal
• Is better suited to effectiveness 
where RCTs are underpowered or 
cannot be undertaken, especially 
public health
• Does not consider other projects • Takes other independent projects 
into account, so risk can be pooled
• Used routinely in health-care 
research for effectiveness
• Used routinely in business world for 
maximizing profits
• Not used in health-care research 
for cost-effectiveness
• Used in health-care research for 
cost-effectiveness
• In practice, does not reverse onus 
of proof when considering harm 
reduction. Thus is inconsistent with 
its conservatism characteristic and 
with the precautionary principle 
  For harm reduction, does not 
reverse onus of proof but often 
does the equivalent via prior beliefs, 
observations, and recognition of 
received theory. Thus is consistent 
with the precautionary principle for 
effectiveness
• Is consistent with the precautionary 
principle for cost-effectiveness 
except in cases of widespread 
catastrophe
•	 “Value	of	information”	cannot	be	
derived (not discussed in main 
text)
•	 “Value	of	information”	may	be	
derived (not discussed in main text)
3
Fischer and Ghelardi The Precautionary Principle for Public Health Evaluation
Frontiers in Public Health | www.frontiersin.org July 2016 | Volume 4 | Article 107
only after effectiveness from RCTs has been established with suf-
ficient certainty.
However, EBM as practiced is inconsistent with respect to 
the totality of outcomes. In EBM, there is generally a primary 
outcome, usually what is believed to be the most important of sev-
eral possible types of outcome. The object of a trial is to attempt 
to determine whether the primary outcome when using an 
intervention is a sufficient improvement on the outcome without 
the intervention, for the improvement to be distinguished from 
a chance improvement. However, other outcomes (in particular, 
adverse events) may well be in the other direction, so that, in total, 
the health gain may not be positive (17). Traditional EBM does not 
try to add these health gains in any way. In some cases, the adverse 
event may be so severe as to result in death, but be rare enough for 
the trial to be too small to capture its true effect with any accuracy. 
In a truly conservative world, most interventions would thus need 
to be rejected, as there is an unknown possibility that they would 
be doing more harm than good. What tends to happen in the real 
world is that when rare but serious side effects occur, the positive 
main outcome remains isolated from other outcomes and thus is 
preserved. At the same time, strenuous efforts are made to enable 
early discovery of potential adverse events and to counter them, 
thus enabling the totality of the effects (if they were to be made 
additive) to become positive. By using this method, EBM man-
ages to insulate itself against use of the PP.
In turn, the NICE Methods Manual for guidelines in Public 
Health (18) follows similar procedures with respect to external 
evidence, but broadens the EBM criteria to allow subjective meas-
ures of effect, essentially following the Bradford Hill criteria. In 
all respects, the methodology is that of DT apart from the need 
to ensure that an intervention has a very low probability of doing 
harm (see Table 1 for a comparison of EBM and DT character-
istics). These measures are generally used when the appropriate 
RCTs are underpowered, or where RCT evidence does not exist, 
and include prior beliefs about the effectiveness of an interven-
tion, the use of non-controlled studies, the role of established 
theory, and expert opinion about current best practice (19).
As we spell out in the next section on the PP, for interventions 
that are designed to reduce harm, prior beliefs, and observation 
(which are admissible evidence for DT) can often establish a 
direction of change of effectiveness with sufficient confidence, 
without requiring a formal demonstration via an RCT.
Whether the effectiveness stage of evaluation is carried out 
using EBM or DT, DT is always used whenever a further stage of 
evaluation is carried out, to establish whether an intervention that 
has been shown to be effective is also cost-effective. This further 
stage of evaluation is not always used. In the USA, evaluation 
of health-care interventions often stops at comparative effective-
ness. In the UK, the evaluation of cost-effectiveness in health-care 
interventions (including those of public health) is carried out on 
a systematic basis by NICE. Other OECD countries tend to be 
somewhere between the USA and the UK in their use of this 
second stage.
For cost-effectiveness analysis that is able to compare dispa-
rate interventions anywhere in health care, the health effects of 
an intervention are converted into one of two similar generic 
measures known as a quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) or a 
disability-adjusted life-year (DALY). (The rest of the paragraph 
describes a QALY analysis; a DALY analysis substitutes “DALY” 
and “DALY lost” for “QALY” and “QALY gained,” respectively.) 
The additional cost of an intervention compared with usual care 
is divided by the health effects of the intervention (over and 
above those of usual care) to produce an incremental cost per 
QALY, known as an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER). 
The interventions with the lowest ICERs (if no other criteria are 
considered) will be the ones approved for use. The approval of 
interventions should stop at that level of ICER where it is thought 
that the health budget will have been exhausted, and that level is 
called the threshold ICER. In this way, the aggregate number of 
QALYs gained from the totality of interventions will be maxi-
mized for a given health budget. For simplicity of exposition, we 
shall exclude from our analysis other factors taken into account in 
the decision process, such as political considerations, value judg-
ments, and social influences. These are not unimportant, but tend 
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to be context-specific and thus are assumed to be held constant 
when comparing the overarching principles found in EBM, DT, 
and the PP.
The sampling variability of the estimated mean ICER is all but 
ignored, on the basis that the health-care provider will have a 
large number of independent projects under consideration for 
funding. The health-care provider is assumed to act as if it were 
an insurer. For example, an insurer of dwellings against fire acts 
on the belief that not every dwelling will be destroyed by fire at 
the same time. That is, they are able to pool the risk of a payout. 
If they have insured a very large number of dwellings, they can, 
in essence, ignore variability altogether: they can act as if they 
are risk-neutral. The assumption of risk neutrality within DT is 
one of its basic features (9). Thus, when applied to whether an 
intervention in health care should be placed on a list of interven-
tions approved for funding, decision makers should be guided by 
whether the estimated mean ICER of the intervention compared 
with usual practice falls below the threshold ICER, with scant or 
zero regard to sampling variability.
The use of a generic measure of health, such as the QALY, 
allows health effects from a trial or observational study to be 
aggregated into a single index. The building blocks that allow 
QALYs to be estimated can be replicated across studies, which 
thereby reduces the subjectivity associated with estimating the 
overall health effects. Thus, the improvement in effects associated 
with the main outcome of an intervention in traditional EBM 
analysis can be measured by the same QALY yardstick as the 
health lost from adverse events. That means that DT used at the 
effectiveness stage of the evaluation has the potential for greater 
accuracy than that of EBM. However, the additional step of the 
tracking and collation of side effects reports, and acting on them, 
which is implicit in EBM analysis, is missing from DT.
The next section introduces the PP into the evaluation process.
tHe preCaUtionary prinCipLe: 
eFFeCtiVeness
The PP may be applied to many aspects of health-care evalua-
tion. For the evaluation of most treatments, particularly drugs, it 
is not known in advance whether the treatment will give positive 
benefits in the form of an improved main outcome compared 
with a relevant comparator. EBM is conservative in that its use 
will not allow the use of new treatments if harm cannot be ruled 
out with sufficient certainty. (As mentioned in the section above, 
this is not always true with respect to rare side effects.) In effect, 
this is a PP at work. That is, there are assumed to be greater risks 
involved in moving away from the status quo than in staying there. 
The PP puts a hurdle in place to reduce the probability of harm 
from treatment.
Public health, in contrast, is mostly concerned with preventing 
future harm. That is, compared with treatment, where ex ante the 
intervention is feared because it may increase harm, the preventa-
tive interventions are designed to reduce harm. The conservative 
approach should thus be to undertake the intervention: greater 
risks are involved in remaining at the status quo. DT recognizes 
this by allowing prior knowledge about harm that may occur 
without intervening, assumes that the intervention reduces 
harm, and proceeds to determine whether the intervention is 
cost-effective. It is thus aligned with the PP, which makes it very 
difficult to favor the status quo. However, if EBM is used in evalu-
ating harm-reduction interventions without reversing the onus 
of proof, its use is inconsistent with the conservative principles 
that many believe should underpin it. Thus, standard EBM, used 
in evaluating harm-reduction interventions, will give different 
answers from those of the PP and DT.
However, the preventative intervention itself may also 
(unwittingly or otherwise) introduce harm, so it will not always 
be clear whether moving away from the status quo is more or 
less conservative than remaining there. An example of the 
conundrum that is thereby posed is the building of new nuclear 
power plants. (Which of these would cause greater harm: the CO2 
increase in staying with coal-fired generators, or the threat posed 
from radioactive waste and a higher probability of the prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons?). Nevertheless, interventions, such as 
education or advice about, say, avoiding unsafe sex, will almost 
certainly reduce harm without much chance of introducing new 
harms. For these cases, therefore, the PP would suggest that the 
onus of proof should be changed: we should think of the “control” 
group as those people who undertake the intervention and the 
“treatment” group as those who receive the status quo.
For interventions in public health that are currently evaluated 
using the standard form of EBM, a change in the method of 
evaluation to DT or the PP could have substantial ramifications: 
a number of public health interventions that currently do not 
receive funding would do so in future. However, humans have 
much greater flexibility of mind than this. They change the rules 
when it suits them, despite the contradictions of the theory. 
A simple example of rule changes to suit “common sense” is given 
by Smith and Pell (20), who have noted that no RCT of parachutes 
has ever been conducted. Strict application of EBM would suggest 
that parachutes should not be used until an RCT has assured their 
safety.
This example implicitly uses DT rather than EBM. DT allows 
the use of prior beliefs and observation. In the above example, 
the prior beliefs about, or observation of, this intervention are 
so strong that the standard EBM rules for effectiveness can be 
by-passed. Threlfall et al. (21) give examples of community gar-
dening and of volunteering for their effect on the mental health 
of elderly people. Trials in these areas are not straightforward: 
how can relatively large numbers of elderly people be successfully 
placed into an active gardening arm of a trial and others into a 
“do nothing” arm? Trials will therefore be small and thus under-
powered, and almost invariably their results will be inconclusive. 
Yet nobody seriously believes that at a population level, the health 
of elderly people wishing to do gardening will be made worse off 
by doing so. Whether a scheme set up to place such people into 
gardening activities is cost-effective is entirely another matter. 
By suggesting the direction in which gardening would improve 
mental health does not necessarily mean that the scheme should 
be undertaken: the effect on mental health might be small and 
the cost of the scheme may be relatively high. That is, allocating 
money to improve the mental health of older people by setting 
up gardening opportunities might be better spent elsewhere, and 
FigUre 1 | the precautionary principle and cost-effectiveness in the absence of self-insurance. Countries are able to self-insure against health risks. They 
can thereby pool risks and act as if they were risk-neutral. If a health problem becomes so great that the country is unable to self-insure, it will become risk-averse 
and will be prepared to pay more per unit of health gain than if it is able to self-insure.
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that has to be estimated using cost-effectiveness analysis. When 
NICE produced a guideline for ways of improving the mental 
health of old people, however, gardening did not feature in its 
recommendations, because the committee considering the evi-
dence had been informed that there was insufficient evidence to 
determine whether the activity would do more good than harm.
The same is true of other public health interventions involv-
ing harm reduction. For example, we can safely believe that a 
reduction in air pollution has a very high probability of not doing 
harm. (Note that here, we are talking about effectiveness and not 
cost-effectiveness, so we do not need to count opportunity cost 
as a harm.) If we apply DT rather than EBM to harm-reduction 
interventions, we already know the direction of change of out-
comes with sufficient certainty. In practice, the DT approach of 
saying that in most harm-reduction circumstances, the direction 
of change of the effect of an intervention is known, yields the 
same result as undertaking an analysis where the onus of proof 
is reversed. That is, instead of having to show with sufficient 
certainty that the intervention that is designed to reduce harm is 
more effective than the status quo, the DT approach is the equiva-
lent of having to show with sufficient certainty that the status quo 
is more effective than the intervention that is designed to reduce 
harm. That is, the PP does not alter conclusions reached by a DT 
analysis for determining effectiveness.
However, the PP makes a difference in an important group of 
cases when cost-effectiveness is considered. As mentioned above, 
we assume that the decision process is two-staged, where the deter-
mination of effectiveness is the first stage and cost-effectiveness 
the second, which is always conducted within decision theory.
For many circumstances within Public Health, RCTs do not 
and in many cases cannot exist. When this occurs and using EBM, 
studies such as those about interventions would be downgraded 
due to the hierarchy of evidence: the quality of the study would 
usually be called “weak.” If that criterion were the only one used, 
decision makers using EBM would not have been able to impose 
taxes on alcohol and tobacco; smoking bans in pubs, restaurants, 
and public transport; or make laws requiring all vehicle drivers 
in a country to drive on the same side of the road (19). It is clear 
that there is an implicit use of either DT or the PP in all such areas. 
All the interventions in the examples given above are designed to 
reduce harm.
tHe preCaUtionary prinCipLe:  
Cost-eFFeCtiVeness
We use standard text-book theory of insurance [for example, 
Ref. (22)] to describe what happens when the insurance function 
of national bodies is analyzed and show what happens when a 
risk cannot be insured. Sunstein (23, 24) recognizes the insur-
ance aspects of the PP, though his analysis is less formal than ours 
below. We begin with individuals.
Figure  1 describes the relationship between wealth and the 
marginal utility of wealth. That is to say: a rich man will value the 
last dollar that he has earnt less than the last dollar earnt if he were 
poor. That is, the marginal utility of a person’s last dollar becomes 
smaller as the number of dollars that the person owns increases.
Suppose a person’s wealth is given as W1, the person’s utility 
of wealth is thus U(W1). We denote the position [W1, U(W1)] in 
Figure 1 by A. Suppose that most of the person’s wealth is in the 
form of a home, and that the remaining wealth is given by W0. 
Its utility is U(W0); and [W0, U(W0)] is given by B in Figure 1. 
Suppose that the probability of the home being destroyed 
is p, so the probability of its not being destroyed is (1 −  p). 
Beforehand, not knowing whether the home will be standing or 
destroyed, the person’s average utility is the average of U(W0) and 
U(W1) weighted by the probabilities p and (1 − p), and is thus 
p × U(W0) + (1 − p) × U(W1). We call the corresponding level 
of wealth W2. We denote the point in Figure 1 as C. This is the 
utility of the uninsured level of wealth. If the person were to pay 
W1 − W2 (=CF in Figure 1) as a fair insurance policy beforehand, 
and the home were subsequently destroyed, the person would 
have a utility of wealth U(W2), given as D in Figure  1. This is 
because the insurance policy allows the home to be rebuilt. The 
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distance DC is the increased utility of having the insurance. The 
distance EC is known as the risk premium. EF is the largest pre-
mium that a person would pay for insuring their home, because 
at E, the person who insures has the same after-the-event utility as 
the person who is uninsured and whose home is destroyed. Thus, 
the person is indifferent between insuring and not insuring when 
they have to pay EF as a premium.
We now apply the analysis of the PP to this situation. In so 
doing and without any loss of generalization, we change what we 
said with respect to an individual in the above paragraph to a 
national body such as a national health service.
The national body self-insures where it can. If instead of 
being home insurance, now suppose that Figure 1 applies to a 
Public Health scenario. In “normal” circumstances, the nation’s 
wealth would be given by W1. In catastrophic circumstances, it 
would be W0. A self-insuring national body would be prepared 
to pay an amount CF for an intervention to avoid W0. When it 
is able to self-insure, CF represents the most that the national 
body needs to pay for the intervention and thus represents the 
intervention’s threshold cost. However, some things would be 
too big to insure against. A nation would not be able to go to 
other nations to insure against a large asteroid strike on the 
earth, or protect against global warming or antibiotic resist-
ance, because all nations would have the same or similar risk. 
However, in terms of orders of magnitude, we can discern from 
Figure 1 what a nation might be prepared to pay when it can no 
longer be risk-neutral. By being unable to self-insure, the nation 
has become risk-averse. In Figure 1, spending as little as CF to 
receive full insurance cover is no longer possible. The nation 
unable to self-insure would pay up to EF. As drawn, EF is more 
than double CF, but for absolute catastrophes that might spell 
the end of the species without an intervention, the concavity 
of the utility of wealth function would increase. If so, a nation 
would presumably be willing to fund projects whose cost to 
benefit ratio were to be greatly in excess of the ratio EF:CF as 
shown in the Figure.
It can thus be argued that the PP for events that a national 
health-care insurer can self-insure against will make no difference 
to the threshold ICER. When a nation is unable to self-insure, 
however, the usual rules of cost-effectiveness, which presuppose 
a national body that acts as if it is risk-neutral, do not apply. The 
amounts that nations will be prepared to pay to avoid global 
warming or antimicrobial resistance may well greatly exceed 
“normal” cost-effectiveness thresholds.
For relatively minor calamities, nations may not be able to 
self-insure but may be able to buy insurance from other nations. 
It may be possible to gain some idea of the risk premium that 
might be needed to be paid by looking at nations that may default 
on international debts. The higher the probability of default, the 
greater the interest rate payable on the debt.
ConCLUsion
This paper examines what happens when the PP is applied to 
health-care interventions.
If the first stage of a decision-making process (the deter-
mination of effectiveness) is to be conservative, then EBM is 
inconsistently applied if it fails to recognize that harm reduction 
is usually a conservative response.
The paper shows that there exists a vast array of circumstances 
where the PP may potentially be used, but that it does not change 
many decisions of national health-care insurers if they are already 
using a decision-theory approach for both effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness. However, if they are using EBM at the effectiveness 
stage in an area of harm reduction, there may be insufficient 
evidence to determine whether an intervention is effective. In 
this case, the application of the PP will often result in different 
decisions being made. In other words, the PP is consistent with a 
decision-theory approach to effectiveness when looking at harm 
reduction, but not consistent with an EBM approach.
Within a decision-theory framework, most health-care insur-
ers are able to act as if they are risk-neutral by pooling risk, as all 
insurers do. When self-insurance is possible, the PP and cost-
effectiveness analysis reach the same conclusion about whether 
an intervention is worthwhile. However, when a risk becomes so 
great that an insurer at the national level is no longer able to self-
insure, the amounts spent on an intervention depend on the extent 
of risk aversion that the nation displays. The decision-theory rules 
of cost-effectiveness break down in such circumstances, as they 
assume risk neutrality. For that reason, it would not be possible 
to determine whether interventions to mitigate climate change or 
antimicrobial resistance are cost-effective: the nation itself must 
decide independently of economists the amounts it is prepared 
to spend to avoid catastrophe. Economists can offer useful advice 
only if they are able to measure a nation’s risk aversion under dire 
circumstances. The PP recognizes this but requires an estimate 
of the extent of a nation’s risk aversion to enable an estimate to 
be made of the size of the amounts that should be spent to avoid 
large-order catastrophes. Since the level of risk aversion will 
depend on the size of the catastrophe, it is unlikely that reliable 
estimates can be made of the amounts that should be spent, given 
that the catastrophe has not yet occurred. What this paper does is 
to alert authorities that it would not be appropriate to try to limit 
expenditure to threshold-cost-per-QALY amounts to counter 
catastrophes.
There may be a middle ground where absolute calamity is 
not likely, but where self-insuring is difficult. An example of 
this could be an epidemic caused by an infectious disease that 
overloads medical facilities and thus displaces health care that 
would normally be available. If a country in this situation had to 
borrow overseas to pay for the costs of treating the epidemic, it 
may have to pay a premium on the repayments, to cover the risk 
of default. This would relate to the extent to which breaking the 
cost per QALY threshold would be required.
Perhaps rather more importantly, the paper is able to answer 
the questions of when to act, given that by reversing the onus 
of proof, the PP will now establish the effectiveness of some 
interventions that could not previously be established. However, 
cost-effectiveness must then also be established before a posi-
tive decision to act can be made. Reversing the onus of proof is 
in essence what DT also does in the same circumstances in 
public health appraisal, so both PP and DT are very likely to 
establish effectiveness in more cases than using standard EBM. 
However, the argument about PP not being affordable if it is used 
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everywhere is a spurious one, because it will only be used where 
it is cost-effective to do so.
The paper also is able to sort out the arguments about 
weak and strong versions of the PP. The weak version says that 
cost-effectiveness should be taken into account when decid-
ing whether to act using the PP as the effectiveness criterion, 
and funding should go only to those interventions that satisfy 
cost-effectiveness. Our analysis reaches the same conclusion. 
However, when a threat or its expectation is sufficiently severe, 
the strong version says that action should be taken regardless of 
cost-effectiveness. Our analysis also gives qualified support for 
this proposition, by loosening the rules for cost-effectiveness: the 
greater the threat, the greater a nation’s risk aversion, so the looser 
the cost-effectiveness threshold becomes. Moreover, we indicate 
in terms of insurability against risk where the weak rule stops and 
the strong rule begins to take effect.
This paper also bolsters the Bradford Hill’s view of how deci-
sions about public health interventions should be evaluated, by 
placing his criteria into a decision theoretic framework. It then 
shows that this framework is in accord with the PP in most 
circumstances but would need to be modified in the face of 
calamities.
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